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HABERMASIAN IDEAL SPEECH: DREAMING THE
(IM)POSSffiLE DREAM
ABSTRACT
In this paper I amplify Habermas's eclecticism, and draw on a variety of
pedagogic, psychologic, philosophic, and feminist literature to explore and
critique the Habermasian Ideal Speech Situation (ISS). I believe that ISS,
as the intersection of various ontological positions, has implications for
our daily practices, and I illustrate how these might be transformed.
Thus, I am proclaiming ISS as an catalyst for reflexive considerations of
our ontological positions, and for instigating transformative processes.
KEYWORDS
Habermasian ideal speech, reality, ideality, gender specificity in speech,
dreaming, creative visualisation, transformation, critical accounting




HABERMASIAN IDEAL SPEECH: DREAMING THE
(IM)POSSmLE DREAM
The work ofJurgen Habermas of the Frankfurt School is complex, wide-
ranging, open to interpretation, and featured in a diversity of disciplinary-
based bodies ofliterature. According to Frank, who was writing within
symbolic interactionism, Habermas is a "theoretical internationalist and
interdisciplinary eclectic" (Frank 1989 p 354). In this paper, I resonate
with the eclecticism, and draw on a range of disciplines to present this
description and critique of the Habermasian Ideal Speech Situation (ISS)
(1974). An underlying theme is the various ontological and
epistemological positions being adopted by the various authors. I draw
some conclusions about ideal speech and identify some implications for
accounting pedagogy, accounting research and accounting practice.
In accounting literature, the ideal speech situation (ISS) has not attracted
a lot of attention. Laughlin described the ideal speech situation, as a
crucial element of Habermasian theoretical discourse but, interestingly,
without naming it (1987 pp 491-493). He raised the issue of possible
participants and prescribed only those few who had the power to change
the phenomena under study. Arrington & Puxty, in their "pedagogic
essay" (1991), described the rules and claimed that Habermas had little to
say about who might be possible participants. However, they also claimed
that it was important to understand the model as "theoretical" and "not a
blueprint for action" (Arrington & Puxty 1991 p 55). Later, Arrington &
Schweiker (1992) named and described the ideal speech situation, but did
not subject it to any critique. I reject this minimal, and in some cases,
dismissive treatment, and desire to (re)construct the importance and the
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usefulness of ISS for those of us who are interested in the pursuit of a
better life.
Weber (1976) noted that in the ISS, Habermas was drawing on the
Hegelian model of mutual recognition. In this model:
each subject both experiences the uniqueness of his {sic} own
experience and translates it into universal terms which can be
understood by the other. Each subject also reflectively recognises
that the other who appears only through those universal terms is
also a unique experiencing subject. (Weber 1976 p 100)
Thus, there is a continuous flow between unique experience, the
construction of one's self interactively with others through universals, and
the unique experience of others. This connotes with a shifting ontological
position from subjectivity, through objectivity as intersubjectivity, to
subjectivity. But this is not decontextualised from a set of values, as
Mourrain pointed out:
Habermas presupposed a moral consensus that values reform (vs
revolt), tradition (vs immorality), reasonableness (vs irrationality)
and hope (vs despair and cynicism). (Mourrain 1989 p 15)
Thus, the ISS is premised on a range of values, and is differentiated from
systematically distorted communication. In discussing this, Held
differentiated maximal and minimal understanding, with the former
referring to meaning constructed through a genuine consensus, that is, by
way of the ISS (1980 p 333). By contrast, minimal understanding was
understanding generated through coercion, thereby distorting meaning.
Therefore, the aim of discourse is to generate a "communicatively secured
consensus" which rests on the authority of the better argument (White
1988 p 102). This is in opposition to systematically distorted
communication or a "normatively secured consensus", which is based on a
_____________________________"..J.
-
conventional, prereflective, taken-for-granted consensus about
values and ends. (Fraser 1987 p 38)
Regarding a "communicatively secured consensus", McCarthy noted that
the authority of the better argument was the "peculiarly unforced force" of
the better argument (1978 p 308). This particular, peculiar force is linked
to appeals to generalisable interests or needs interpretations. McCarthy
noted
one of the levels of discourse that is a precondition of rational
consensus is the thematization of available need interpretations
themselves; interests are neither empirically found nor simply
posited - they are shaped and discovered in processes of
communication. (McCarthy 1978 p 328)
The use of the word "discovered" by McCarthy in the above quote,
indicates the extent to which Habermas is adopting a realist ontological
position. White recognised that Habermas was not using needs in a
biological sense, but was relativising them to the cultural needs of any
given society (1988 p 70). Nevertheless, Habermas was referring to
generalisable or communicatively shared interests. Moon claimed that
communicatively shared needs were those which "can be acknowledged
both to oneself and to others" (1983 p 179). Slightly differently
emphasized, Mezirow noted that an interpretation of needs involved an
understanding of "historical, cultural and biographical reasons for one's
needs, wants and interests" (1985 p 147). Gouldner noted that giving
reasons was communicating "something about the self' (1976 p 216). As
Habermas wrote:
Only to the extent that the interpreter grasps the reasons that
allow the author's utterances to appear as rational does he
5
translators persistently use "he" and reproduce "he" as a pseudogeneric
(see Smithson 1990 p 4, who argued that "almost all men and most women
conceive of males when they encounter 'man', 'mankind' and 'he'"). This is
similar to Phillips who argued that "each gender-neutral abstraction ends
up as suspiciously male" (1992 p 11).
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understand what the author could have meant. 1 (1987 volume 1 p
132 emphases in original).
However, according to Moon, Habennas recognised that disputes would
arise which could not be settled by appealing to generalisable interests,
because the interests in question were particular (1983 p 179), Further,
he claimed that
In such cases it is appropriate to settle these issues through
compromise, provided the relative power of the contending parties
is approximately equal. (Moon 1983 p 179)
The Rules of Ideal Speech
Using White's formulation, and amending it to remove sexist language,
the rules of the ideal speech situation are:
1 Each subject who is capable of speech and action is allowed to
participate in discourse
2 a Each is allowed to call into question any proposal
2 b Each is allowed to introduce any proposal into the discourse
2 c Each is allowed to express attitudes, wishes and needs
1 I appreciate that the use of the translator's "he" is not an example
of sexist writing by Habermas, given that the original "es'' can be used to
mean "he, she or it". It is unfortunate that English does not have a non-








3 No speaker ought to be hindered by compulsion - whether arising
from inside the discourse or outside of it - from making use of the
rights secure under (1) and (2). (White 1988 p 56)
In the first rule the reference to action is a reminder that, for Habermas,
the process had an action orientation, and also that capability is an issue
(1988 p 56). In an earlier paper, White claimed that our skill in
constructing the ISS contributed to how we construct our "ideas of truth,
freedom, and justice" (1983 p 168 - 169). This is similar to Miller's claim
that:
To be conscious of unfreedom one must have a concept of what
freedom and respect for life are. (Miller 1992 p 84)
However, White also noted that "we in some sense choose to participate",
and thus the choice must be informed (1983 p 169). In 1988, White had
adopted a more critical stance, particularly with the third rule. He
claimed that "the first two rules are fairly straightforward rules for fair
argumentation" (1988 p 56). He claimed that it was the third rule which
implied two further rules for "pure communicative action". One was the
openness generated by an expression of sincere feelings and the second
was the equality of opportunity. Both of these were necessary for the
elimination of "deception, power and ideology" (White 1988 p 56). The
issue of communicative competence, hence capability, is central to the
works of Habermas. As Frank noted, Habermas understood the loss of
communicative rationality to be the "fundamental threat of our time"
(1989 p 354). The prescribed absence of coercion is more noticeable in rule
three. McCarthy made the point that structural constraints, either "open
or latent, conscious or unconscious", must be excluded (1978 p 308).
Mezirow amplified the Habermasian rules and claimed that participants
in an ISS would have:
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(1) accurate and complete information about the topic discussed,
(2) the ability to reason argumentatively and reflectively about
disputed validity claims, and
(3) self-knowledge sufficient to assure that their participation is
free of inhibitions, compensatory mechanisms or other forms
of self-deception. (Mezirow 1985 p 144)
First, the notion that it is possible for participants to have "accurate and
complete information" has connotations of a realist ontology. However,
even within a realist ontology, irrespective of how or where we "look", we
only "see" a part of any picture (see Hines 1989a and 1989b). A
constructivist approach would acknowledge a dialectical construction of
knowledge and reality, and hence recognise the limitations of
completeness and accuracy (see Guba 1990 for a discussion, set within
pedagogy, of the differences). The second of Mezirow's points is not so
much an amplification of Habermas, but a reiteration. The third point
raises the issue of self-knowledge and a lack of self-deception. Mezirow
was writing in critical pedagogy and claimed that this self-knowledge was
a necessary precursor to the requisite autonomy in self-directed or
emancipatory learning. Further, he claimed that an ideal speech situation
would be free of both internal and external forms of constraint or
coercion. It would provide for equality of opportunity to participate
and for reciprocity in the roles assumed by participants in the
discourse - to proffer interpretations and explanations; to challenge,
refute, criticize assumptions; to order and prohibit; to obey and
refuse; to express intentions and attitudes; and to speak with
confidence. Arguments would be based upon the evidence and
would not be distorted by deliberate tactics of debate or one-
upmanship. The requirements for an ideal dialogue are identical to
8
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those which pertain to the ideal of enlightened self-directed
learning. (Mezirow 1985 p 144)
The extent of the discursive actions available is expressly broad, and there
is the recognition that there must be a responsible intent. Mezirow then
linked the ideal speech situation to emancipatory learning, and clearly in
contrast to Arrington & Puxty (1991), saw the ISS as a guide to action in
teaching/learning.
Bredo & Feinberg suggested, that for a critical theorist to observe
distorted understanding in the Habermasian sense, they must have
anticipations of authentic communication which
forms the background against which the distortion may be seen,
and to judge the validity of particular accounts he or she must rely
on communication itself that approximates an ideal of undistorted
communication. (Bredo & Feinberg 1982b p 281)
They described the ideal speech situation in the following way:
(1) no violence,
(2) permeable boundaries between public and private speech,
(3) allowance of traditional symbols and rules of discourse to be
made problematic, and
(4) insistence on equal opportunities to speak. (Brede &
Feinberg 1982b p 284)
The first of Bredo & Feinberg's list connotes the lack of force, or as White
termed it, a lack of "compulsion" (1983 p 167). However, there is a
compulsion in the ideal speech situation, and this is the problematic,
prescribed focus on reason, based on needs interpretations. Interestingly,
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GouIdner noted that giving reasons is acting subliminally to assure others
that violence is not imminent (1976 p 216) 2
The second can be seen as a widening of the boundaries of speech, which is
similar to feminist challenges of what is "public" and what is "private". It
is arguable that the tradition referred to in the third, is also challenged by
feminist scholars. The fourth item is one that, while central to Habermas,
is also problematic. These issues will be addressed in a later section.
Bredo & Feinberg, using GouIdner (1976), concluded:
In Gouldner's view freedom and equality are two independent
dimensions along which one can describe contemporary ideologies.
Habermas' conception of an ideal speech situation is one that
emphasizes freedom of access but that seems to presuppose equality
of communicative competence. ... there is a potential conflict
between these two norms that Habermas does not acknowledge, for
greater competence could be used as a legitimate reason to provide
greater access. That is, once we recognize that there may well be
different levels of communicative competence, then there seems to
be something problematic about an ideal speech community that
does not recognise this. To recognise it, however, may force us to
mitigate the idea of equal access in a direction that would lead us to
accommodate variations in competence. (Brede & Feinberg 1982b p
275)
2 Feminist scholars would argue that giving reasons in response to
statements of feelings and emotions, and/or privileging rationality, are
acts of violence (see Braidotti 1991 pp 277 - 280).
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Schrag focussed on the normative, ethical ideals of participants engaging
in striving for agreement and consensus, in the ideal speech situation
(1986 pp 62-63). He claimed
This is the salvageable insight of Habennas's appeal to ideality as a
condition for discourse ... it is in the field of human action that the
sedimentation of ethical idealities is most clearly visible. What we
do as individuals and institutions is shaped by the insinuation of
ideals of action. Some of these ideals are very much in the forefront
of consciousness; others are more recessed, eclipsed by a social
forgetfulness or the intrusion of self-deception and ideology.
(Schrag 1986 pp 62-63)
Thompson described the conditions of the ideal speech situation and then
proceeded to identify a limitation (1981 pp 92 - 94). He claimed that the
silences in Habermas's construction of the ideal speech situation can be
linked to his use of psychoanalytic theory:
the constraints which affect social life may operate in modes other
than the restriction of access to speech-acts, for example by
restricting access to weapons, wealth or esteem. The neglect of
these considerations is closely connected ... to the use of
psychoanalysis as a model for critical theory. (Thompson 1981 p
203)
Addressing Habermas's use of Freud is outside the ambit of this paper,
however I do reject Thompson's claim that Habermas's use of the
psychoanalytical model is solely responsible for neglect of these
constraints. Here, I focus on critiques of the ideal speech situation from
other vantage points.
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Critiques of the Ideal Speech Situation:
One needs to pose the crucial question: who decides who is capable of ideal
speech and action, and should be potentially excluded. I believe that no
person should be excluded from potential transformative processes, and
hence would reject Laughlin's (1987) prescription. Lukes discussed in
some detail this question of who would be potential participants (1982 pp
139 - 141). He suggested three possibilities: either actual people, or
typical people, or ideally rational people could be imagined to participate
in undistorted communication. He rejected all three as impossible.
According to Ingram, Bourdieu's analysis of the ideal speech situation
concluded that privileging discursive rationality perpetuates "interclass
linguistic difference" (1982 p 158). As an example, the use of nonverbal
gesture is apparently more prevalent in working-class speech (see Ingram
1982 p 158). Further, Bourdieu (1982) explored the role of "cultural
capital", and this may create variations in the abilities or various
participants to take up the equal opportunities.
Schrag claimed that a focus on the interplay of"argumentation and
counterargumentation suppresses the performance in discourse in its
nonargumentative form" (1986 p 61). This is an important point because
such a focus silences alternatives such as playful verbal interaction, puns,
and poetry, and, as well, it denies nonverbal forms of communication.
Further, Elster argued for the usefulness of many irrationalities,




Lukes (1982) pointed out a variety of barriers which might exist to
preclude communicatively secured consensus in the ideal speech situation.
These barriers included:
prejudices, limitations of vision and imagination, deference to
authority, fears, vanities, self-doubts and so on. (Lukes 1982 p 139)
Moon (1983) expressed the view that it was impossible for a consensus of
values to be reached discursively, and that discussion would go on
endlessly. It was claimed that many conflicts could not be settled because
our conception of what is in our interests depends upon our
conception of the self, or what it is to be a person, and it is far from
obvious that people who do not take a great deal about their lives
and the structure of their society for granted could come to agree on
such a conception. Even more important, moral conflicts may not
simply express conflicts of interest but also involve conflicting moral
ideas and world-views; the standard of generalisable interests is too
narrow a perspective to resolve such disputes. (Moon 1983 p 187)
Fay (1987) had a slightly different means of rejecting the ideal speech
situation. He argued that understanding does not equal agreement, and
thus, is insufficient as an emancipatory mechanism (1987 p 190). He
claimed that another ideal, one which recognised and defended rational
disagreement, needed to be formulated. His ideal has four interconnecting
theories: the theories of the body, tradition, force and reflexivity (1987 p
213). His formulation was intended to capture every situation of gains
and losses, change and stasis, of possibility and limit (1987 p 215). Thus,
he would argue for the replacement of the whole of Habermas's theory of
communicative action with his formulation.
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Schweickart argued that Habermas's ideal speech situation was a
patriarchal embodiment of the "ethic of rights" (1990 p 87). She drew on
Gilligan's (1982) argument that the development of men's moral reasoning
was predicated on an "ethic of rights". 3 Because of this exclusive
commitment to rights, Schweickart argued that there was little
elaboration of the role of the listener, primarily because the discussion of
prevailing theories of discourse "has been virtually uninformed by the
subjective and intersubjective experience of women" (1990 p 87). In order
to address this, she drew on the '''ethic of care' associated with feminine
moral reasoning" (Schweickart 1990 pp 87 - 91). This is similar to Dass &
Bush who called for the inclusion of compassion in action (1992 see
particularly pp 262 - 267), and to Tronto (1990). In conclusion,
Schweickart noted:
My point is not that Habermas is uncaring, but rather that his
theory of communicative action suffers from the exclusion of the
morality and sense of sociality that is rooted in the experience of the
caring relation. (1990 p 91)
3 Gilligan (1982) was subjecting the work of Kohlberg (1981) to
feminist critique. Interestingly, it was this work of Kohlberg which
Habermas drew on to identify developmental stages of moral
consciousness (see 1987 volume 2 pp 174 - 179). Both McCarthy (1982)
and Lukes (1982) commented on what they saw as Habermas's uncritical
acceptance of Kohlberg's work. Further, see Benhabib (1987) for a
discussion and rejection of Kohlberg's response to Gilligan's critique. She
argued that Kohlberg was viewing the moral self as "disembedded and




This is similar to the critique by Narayan (1990), a nonwestern feminist.
She argued that Habermas's silence on the differences in the ideal speech
situation imposed by "class, race or gender" severely restricted its
application (Narayan 1990 p 261). She claimed that a focus on rational
consensus seemed to overlook the "possibility of agreement or knowledge
based on sympathy or solidarity" (1990 p 262). She used an example of a
defined community divulging sensitive information, which rendered
people vulnerable, to suggest that sympathy or solidarity might generate
new knowledge beyond that generated through rational discourse.
Griffiths (1988) was concerned with the relative silencing of feelings in
Habermasian rationality. She claimed that trying to explain adult human
behaviour as embodied solely in rational understanding was a futile
exercise:
The feelings of adults cannot be understood in terms of brute
sensations acted upon by rational thoughts. Nor can emotions be
understood as by-products of thought, independent of human
sensations of bodies. (Griffiths 1988 p 148)
She suggested a complex, interactive model in which feelings and
emotions should be understood, both in the history of a human being's life
and in the social context of that individual's life. This implied that feeling
is genderised (see also Markus & Kitayama 1991 particularly p 247 for a
review of construals of Self and gender). The model would include the
concept of understanding being dependent upon shared feeling, with such
understanding then, interactively, contributing to both language and
feeling. Griffiths claimed
Thus the understanding of a situation will depend on the feelings as
well as on the reasoning abilities that are brought to it. (Griffiths
1988 p 146)
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Further, Griffiths claimed that the communication of feelings, "by
intonation, use of names of emotions, inarticulate expression, descriptions
of emotional states" (1988 p 146) allowed a sharing of experience which
generates new understandings of social or political relationships and
connections. These new understandings could extend to power structures,
and of their influence on our own self-understanding. Clearly, the process
is continuing and dialectical:
Our feelings prompt the articulation of our beliefs about the world,
and the pattern of conceptualisation of it. They reflect both factual
and evaluative judgements. (Griffiths 1988 p 147)
Griffiths claimed that feelings were a source of knowledge (see also J aggar
& Bordo (eds) 1989 for various feminist expositions of the role of the body
in constructing knowledge) and should be treated seriously as such.
Feelings, being something to which a person has privileged access (in the
Habermasian sense), may be difficult to access or, of course, may be
misinterpreted. Nevertheless, Griffiths proclaimed feelings as a route to
truth because they provided us with "our beliefs about the world and also
provide a basis for assessing these beliefs" (1988 p 148). Finally, Griffiths
prescribed that
a rational agent is required to attend to and reflect on feelings, not
to attempt to control them, except in so far as a rearticulation of
feelings might be appropriate in the light of reflection. (Griffiths
1988 p 148/149)
The recognition of feelings as gendered, above, is used to link back to
Habermas (1987) and the feminist movement:
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the emancipation of women means not only establishing formal
equality and eliminating male privilege, but overturning concrete
forms of life marked by male monopolies. Furthermore, the
historical legacy of the sexual division of labour to which women
were subjected in the bourgeois nuclear family has given them
access to contrasting virtues, to a register of values complementary
to those of the male world and opposed to a one-sidedly rationalized
everyday practice. (Habennas 1987 volume 2 p 393/4)
This quotation leads me to pose the question of the extent to which
generalisable interests are gender-silent? In fact, it is this point that
Fraser (1987) used to focus her critique (see Braaten 1991 p 92 and pp 147
- 150 for commentary). As Fraser noted, Habennas was silent on the issue
of feminism except for the identification of the feminist movement as
potentially emancipatory (1987 p 32). Therefore, although Fraser noted
that this was a serious deficiency, it did not deter her from critique by
adopting the standpoint of "absence" (1987 p 32).
Because Habermas omitted any mention of the child-bearing role, and
failed to thematize the gender subtext of the role of worker and consumer,
Fraser claimed that he failed to understand "precisely how the capitalist
workplace is linked to the modern, restricted, male-headed, nuclear
family" (1987 p 45). Fraser claimed that a gender-sensitive reading of
links between the "private and public" sphere reveal that male dominance
is intrinsic, "rather than accidental", to capitalism. She claimed that
worker/work and consumer are not economic concepts but, like public and
private, are "gender-economic concepts". Thus, she argued that a critical
social theory of capitalist societies needed gender-sensitive categories
(1987 p 46).
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Although Jaggar (1989) did not mention the works of Habermas, she did
review western feminist concerns with the relative silencing of emotion in
rationality. She traced the role of emotion in positivist research, followed
by a cognitive or intentional account of emotion, and concluded with an
account of emotions as socially constructed and interactive with
knowledge. Emotion in positivistic research, termed the "Dumb View"
(Jaggar 1989 p 149), was seen to be separable from both "reason and sense
perception" (p 148) and was linked to the notion of a "dispassionate
observer" (p 155). On the other hand, later cognitive or intentional
versions of emotion focussed on the associated thought. As an example, I
might be agitated but focus on this as thinking anxiously about a lecture I
have to give shortly. However, as Jaggar pointed out, this results in
replicating the supposed problem to be solved, that is, distinguishing
between thought and emotion (1989 p 149-50). Drawing on diverse
research into cultures, she concluded that there are complex "linguistic
and other social preconditions for the experience of human emotions"
(Jaggar 1989 p 151).
Jaggar (1989) then considered the epistemological implications of the
claim that emotion is socially constructed. First, she noted the positivistic
separation of the logic of discovery, where emotion is permitted, and the
logic ofjustification, where emotion is seen as distortive (pp 154 - 155).
Second, she noted the anti-positivist argument that such a separation is
not viable. Third, she noted that the rejection of the separation has not
permitted emotion and knowledge to be regarded as "mutually
constituitive" (Jaggar 1989 p 157). In order to offer an explanation for
this, she explored various stereotypes of men and women.
18
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The stereotypes of "cool men and emotional women" persisted, even
though there was no particular reason to suppose that the thoughts and
actions of women were influenced by emotion, more pervasively than were
the thoughts and actions of men (Jaggar 1989 p 158). She then claimed
that this was related to the ideologically forceful myth of a dispassionate
researcher.
According to Jaggar, the mythical ideal of dispassionate enquiry,
reproduced and bolstered the "epistemic authority of the currently
dominant groups, composed largely of white men" (1989 p 158). At the
same time, this myth functioned to discredit the observations of currently
subordinate groups including people of colour and women. Thus, there
was "epistemological justification" for silencing these groups (Jaggar 1989
p 158). Further, the more vehemently these subordinate groups reported
their observations, the more emotional they appeared. Hence, they were
more easily discredited. As she concluded:
The alleged epistemic authority of the dominant groups then
justifies their political authority. (Jaggar 1989 p 158)
Jaggar was not claiming that emotions were more basic than observation,
reason or action, but she argued that neither were they secondary. She
concluded that each of these faculties reflected an aspect of human
knowledge "inseparable from the other aspects", and that the development
of each was a "necessary condition for the development of all" (Jaggar
1989 pp 164 - 165).
Writing on Habermas and feminism, Meisenhelder claimed that
Habermas's privileged rationality is
19
comfortable for men because it disallows the value of the emotions.
The realm of the emotions is given to women, who in turn are
dominated and thus pose little threat of challenging the ideology
and the fundamental fears of men. (Meisenhelder 1979 p 127)
Paradoxically, Barrett concluded that, notwithstanding the gender
deficiencies in Habermas's work, it can be seen as rescuing feminism from
the "irrationalism and political limitations of post-modern perspectives"
(1992 p 216).
From this broad sweep through the privilege of rationality over emotion
and feeling, I wish to focus on possible gender differences in speech.
Tannen (1991) claimed that there were identifiable and profound
differences in the way in which most men and women conducted
conversations. Tannen's primary argument was that most men, because
of their hierarchical world view, conducted conversations as though they
were negotiating to "achieve and maintain the upper hand if they can, and
protect themselves from others' attempts to put them down" (1991 pp
24/25). The aim oflife was to "preserve independence and avoid failure" (p
25). Alternatively, most women, because their world view was
emphasising a "network of connections", negotiated for closeness,
"confirmation and support" (p 25). The aim was to "preserve intimacy and
avoid isolation" (p 25). Although Tannen (1991) acknowledged that there
are hierarchies in women's world views, the relevant attribute is more
likely to be friendship rather than power. One can argue that Tannen's
generalisations are epistemologically limited, and that there is insufficient




trivialises our experience of injustice and of conversational
dominance, it disguises power differences, it conceals who has to
adjust. (Troemel-Ploetz 1991 p 501)
In her critique, Troemel-Ploetz drew on the work of Henley & Kramarae
(1991), who not only identified differences in communicative styles
between women and men, but who also discused the role of power in
whose version will prevail. Henley & Kramarae questioned whose speech
style was seen as normal, and who was required to learn the
communicative style of the other (1991 p 20). Notwithstanding its obvious
deficiencies, Tannen's (1991) work can also be linked with the work of
Gilligan (1982), Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule (1987), Gowen
(1991), and Krol (1991) through a continuing theme of gendered
differences in communicative styles and world views. 4
Kellner acknowledged concern that the Habermasian consensus had
potential to repress differences, and claimed that respect for differences
needed to be built into the discourse (1989 p 227), although he was not
explicit about the processes through which this could be achieved.
Ottmann (1982) believed that, even when the conditions of the ideal
speech situation were fulfilled, there would still be constraining factors.
He argued:
one still has to take into account the pressure of time, the necessity
of having to decide, the limited capacity to take up or alter topics of
4 Preliminary findings by lrigaray (1993) indicate that there are
substantial differences between women's and men's discourse (see
particularly pp 29 - 36). Unfortunately, the complete English translation
of her work to date on this issue is still 'forthcoming'.
IL _
communication, and the fatigue of those participating in the
dialogue. (Ottmann 1982 p 95)
Clearly, the issue of participants' capabilities is problematic, because who
is to know what anyone, including one's self, is capable of? Further, as
Eisenstein noted
Creating equal opportunities to speak was not the same as ensuring
that these opportunities would be equally distributed, or equally
utilized. (1984 p 40)
Or, as Tannen put it:
Being admitted to a dance does not ensure the participation of
someone who has learned to dance to a different rhythm. (1991 P
95)
From dancing to fairy tales: Ottmann noted the German fairy tale of
Tischlein - Deck - Dich, which involves verbalising a wish which
immediately leads to its realisation (1982 p 89). I wonder to what extent
this may have influenced Habermas?
In summary, within an ideal speech situation, all participants have equal
responsibility to provide rational argument, equal opportunity for making
suggestions, and requesting explanations. Further, it seems to me that, if
participants in an ideal speech situation were unaware of the possibility of
gender differences in speech, and a denial of the importance of emotions,
this could limit the transformative potential.
The Jungian archetype, the inner child, is claimed to be at the core of
catalytic processes of transformation aimed at fulfilling one's potential as
a human being (see Abrams 1991: a book of readings within which authors
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from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds explore the adult potential to
reclaim the inner child). Thus, more child-like and hence more playful
forms of interaction may be more successful in a transformative process
(see Bateson 1982, for a discussion of the relationship between play and
fantasy in communication).
Perhaps Habermas's focus on rationality is closely connected with his
relative under-development of inner worlds. This is supported by Brand
who referred to Habermas's "neglect of inner nature" (1990 p 121).
However, White, commenting on Habermasian works, did acknowledge
that accumulation of knowledge required a "willingness to transgress the
normal, a playfulness, imaginativeness and inventiveness" (1988 p 148).
Transgressing the Normal:
It is necessary to recall that the focus on the Habermasian ISS is on an
ideal. As Bredo & Feinberg noted:
such situations do not presently exist, or exist only locally and
fleetingly, they remain an ideal, but one that we can attempt to
approximate. (Bredo & Feinberg 1982b p 284)
The very idea of ideal is that it connotes with something not currently
present, and it seems to me that returning to the notion of fantasy
(Bateson 1982) and imagination (Freire & Shor 1987, particularly p 186)
might be useful in explicating this further. This does involve
transgressing the normal, particularly in academic accounting papers! In
doing so, I see this work as part of an emerging trend toward a rejection of
Cartesian dualism (see Berman 1990 for a provocative analysis of Western
society, in which he explored the relationship between the physical, that
is, bodily, experience of humanity through the ages, and society at the
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time). I join with Melser (1993), in a call for researchers to consider
whole-person knowing. Taken to its logical conclusion, this means that we
use all of our resources to generate/construct knowledge.
Creative Visualisation:
For some time I have been aware of a process, usually termed creative
visualisation, which is widely, and successfully, used in non-medical
treatment of severe and chronic diseases. According to Kehoe, creative
visualisation involved:
using your imagination to see yourself in a situation that hasn't yet
happened, picturing yourself having or doing the thing you want,
and successfully achieving the results you desire. (Kehoe 1987 p
87)
One uses one's imagination, in a deeply relaxed state, to visualise, to
conjure up, an ideal state. Somehow or other, this signals the possibility,
or at least, a story about the possibility of transformation. Thus, although
Habennas has been criticised for prescribing a situation which contained
impossible conditions, I believe these criticisms to be largely irrelevant.
When the ISS is seen as being similar to creative visualisation, the
limitations of the "impossible" fall away to insignificance. Thus, I wish to
shift the focus from a concern about constraints, conscious or unconscious,
to a celebration of our capacities of all levels of consciousness, including
the above conscious, deeply-relaxed state in creative visualisation. Once I
embraced the possibilities of seeing the ISS in this way, I came to see the
potentials inherent in dreaming.
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Creative Dreaming:
To many people their dreams are of no significance. If they are
occasionally remembered on awakening, they are shrugged off, dismissed
as having little meaning or relevance, and ignored. An alternative
position is that there is much for us to learn from our dreams which will
enable us to increase our awareness, a crucial step in any emancipatory
action. Perhaps it is as simple as this: ifyou believe your dreams are
unimportant, they will be unimportant, and, if you believe that they are
important, then they will be important. The familiar self-fulfilling
prophesy at work again.
However, I also believe that we can use dreaming as a tool; we can create
our dreams. We can create dreams about achieving transformations and
emancipation. In doing so this, at least potentially, has the effect of
constructing an environment for the achievement of transformations and
emancipation in our usual, fully-awake state. While this may seem an
outrageous, bizarre, "unreal" and "irrational" suggestion to many, it
should be noted that there is a considerable body of knowledge regarding
the interpretation of dreams from the likes of Freud and Jung (see
Holbeche 1991 for a recent summary). While Freud essentially saw
dreams as repositories for our sexual shame, Jung saw our dreams as
reliable signposts in our search for better lives. More recently, Mindell
(1982, 1985 & 1990) believed that the unconscious 'dreambody' was an
active agent constantly expressing itself in our lives, not only in dreams or
illness, and that most of our problems arose from not harmonising with it.
There is a long tradition of various cultures using dreaming as a
facilitative mechanism. Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician (c 460-
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360 BC), believed that early signs of illness could be perceived in certain
dreams, from which he reasoned that other dream images, like radiant
sunshine, could be used for therapeutic purposes (Garfield 1976 pp 24-25).
According to Holbeche, a Roman soothsayer, Artemidorus of Ephesus,
drew on ancient Egyyptian and Greek civilisation and wrote a book on
dreaming in the second century AD and claimed that "dreams and visions
are infused into men (sic) for their advantage and instruction" (1991 p 65).
Garfield argued that using dreams as facilitative mechanisms was not
restricted to the ancient Greeks, but these practices were prevalent in
ancient Hebrew, Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Muslim
communities. Many indigenous cultures today, including the Australian
Aborigine, the Malaysian Senoi, the African Xhosa, and many American
First Peoples, all place a measure of importance on dreaming and
integrate their dreaming more fully into their lives (Holbeche 1991).
Implications for our Practices:
I believe that the Habermasian ISS has many implications for our daily
practices. Thus, I see the potential "practical" application of this
"theorising". Habermas argued that
the emancipatory interest in knowledge guarantees the
connection between theoretical knowledge and an 'object domain' of
practical life which comes into existence as a result of
systematically distorted communication and thinly legitimated
repression. (Habermas 1978 p 372 emphases in original)
In the following sections I briefly explore some implications for accounting
education, research and practice, with the caveat that I also see reflexivity
as an essential part of critical practice.
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Implications for Accounting Pedagogy:
Consider (dream) for a moment, that in every interaction we had as
lecturers with students, we attempted to approximate the ISS. Consider
us actively promoting students' contesting our decisions: asking us for our
reasons for our actions, and making suggestions. Consider us as being no
more powerful than students. Sound threatening? I guess it is for many.
But this type of thinking and acting and feeling is at the core of the
critical pedagogic practices of the likes of Bredo & Feinberg (1982a). As
with all critical work, the aim is emancipation. There is a recognition that
knowledge is constructed and that students have just as much to teach us
as we have to teach them. My dreaming about this aspect of my daily
practice centres around constructing co-operative and collaborative
learning communities.
Implications for Accounting Research:
Lather believed that:
Research approaches inherently reflect our beliefs about the world
we live in and want to live in. (1991 p 51)
I want to live in a world of more equal power distributions, and hence
chose critical approaches in my researching now. In essence this means
that I am not only trying to gather information in research, I am
attempting, with other participants, to transform the particular
phenomenon under study. The implications of the ISS is that, in all
interactions, I operate (dream) with an awareness of, and appreciation of
the rules of ideal speech and interpretations of needs. This involves,
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among other things, a continual questioning of my assumptions, and, at
the same time, carrying out action.
Implications for Accounting Practice:
My current dreaming about the ISS in accounting practice centres around
the 'true and fair view requirement' in financial reporting. My dream is of
a community of users, and those affected by accounting information,
constructing the decisions/meanings about this phrase, using ISS in
discourses.
Conclusion:
I believe it is possible to use ideality, either in creative visualisation or
dreaming, to assist in our emancipatory efforts. I believe that once we
fully embrace whole-person knowing, we have many techniques,
constituting a range of ontological positions, at our disposal. I see this
belief connected to the Jungian archetype of the medial woman, who,
according to Estes, "stands between the world of consensual reality and
the mystical unconscious and mediates between them" (1992 p 289). The
medial woman is the "transmitter and receiver between two or more
values and ideas". In conclusion, Estes claimed that this archetype
is the one who brings new ideas to life, exchanges old ideas for
innovative ones, translates between the world of the rational and
the world of the imaginal. (Estes 1992 p 289)
I hope that this paper, and myself as author, can be dreamed into medial
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